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"There is much difference between imitating a man and
counterfeiting him."
Benjamin Franklin
INTRODUCTION
"The online shopping trend is like an explosion."' Online
shopping sales total billions of dollars each year and continue to
increase with each passing year. 2 Retailers that were originally "brick
and mortar" are turning increasingly to the Internet to expand their
retail sales and reach a wider audience.
3
Internet sales are amplified in our "instant-gratification society."
4
Additionally, the Internet allows people to purchase items, often for a
price substantially lower than retail.5 Especially in the current
economy, more people are shopping online to save time and money.
6
Thus, the motivation behind online purchases appears to be grounded
in convenience and economics.7
1. Christina Occhipinti, Online Holiday Shopping Continues to Rise in
Popularity, WESTCHESTER COUNTY Bus. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at 5 (statement of Howard
Davidowitz).
2. Id. ("Online holiday shopping totaled $30.1 billion in sales, up 30 percent
from 2004.").
3. Henry Nasella, The Second Dot-Coming: Brick-and-Mortars Must Move
Online, DIRECT MARKETING, Sept. 30, 2000, at 34 (discussing how the best retailers
have always been open to new channels of branded distribution and how brick and
mortar businesses' online prospects look promising).
4. John Farmer, Brand Makers Battle eBay, But Who Wins?, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2008, at D26.
5. Id.
6. W. David Gardner, High Gas Prices Fuel Move to Online Shopping, INFO.
WK., Apr. 22, 2008, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/
internet/retail/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=207401333 (discussing how the rising
price of gas is contributing to online shopping).
7. See Farmer, supra note 4 ("You could spend days cruising consignment
shops. Or, in a few clicks [online], you could view 80 hits on eBay for '[T]iffany
sterling silver bracelet' with prices running from a [sic] $10 to $200.").
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Unfortunately, along with the increase in online sales has come an
increase in the sale of counterfeit items.8 Counterfeiting is a $600
billion a year problem, and that problem is only growing.9 In fact, 5%
to 7% of the global trade is counterfeited goods. 10 The effect of
counterfeiting takes a toll on a large number of people; for example,
counterfeit merchandise is estimated to be directly responsible for the
loss of almost one million jobs in the United States alone.11
Counterfeit goods sold over the Internet have consequences not only
for buyers, but also for businesses operating the websites that facilitate
the fraudulent sales. 12 One group caught up in the worldwide
counterfeiting problem is online auction houses. 13 One major website
affected by counterfeit sales is eBay, Inc. ("eBay").
, For eBay, the legal effects and implications of these counterfeit
sales reached a critical point in the summer of 2008, both domestically
and abroad. On July 14, 2008, in a counterfeiting suit brought by
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany & Co. (collectively "Tiffany") against
eBay, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found in favor of the e-commerce powerhouse. 14
Unfortunately for eBay, their legal victory domestically was
diminished by losses in France. On June 4, 2008, a Paris Commercial
Court found eBay liable of counterfeiting in connection with an
imitation Hermes bag sale. 15 On June 30, 2008, another French court
found eBay liable of similar counterfeiting allegations made by the
LVMH Group ("LVMH") in connection with the sale of counterfeit
8. See The International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Get Real-The Truth
About Counterfeiting, http://www.iacc.org/counterfeiting/counterfeiting.php (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Emily Favre, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect
Brand Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 165, 168-69 (discussing
how online counterfeiting has "reshaped consumer buying and selling behavior" and
how Internet websites have a difficult time policing their sites for counterfeit goods).
13. Id. at 171-77 (discussing several prominent online auction houses and the
steps they have taken to protect against counterfeiting).
14. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
15. Patrick Van Eecke & Maarten Truyens, Recent Events in EU Internet Law,
12 NO. 2 J. INTERNET L. 25, 25 (2008) [hereinafter Van Eecke & Truyens].
2009]
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Louis Vuitton bags. 16 The conflicting treatment of eBay in the United
States and Europe caused a "worrying discrepancy," along with a
great deal of confusion. 1 7
To resolve this confusion, the Legislature should enact laws,
similar to the Lanham Act,' 8 which deal with Internet websites and
intellectual property rights. The Act should serve to promote e-
commerce, as it is an important part of the evolving modem economy,
while still protecting trademark owners from counterfeiting. Further,
the Act would serve as uniform law and resolve conflicting rulings
handed down by the courts.
This Comment will explore whether an online company
facilitating transactions over the Internet can be or should be held
liable for counterfeit sales by sellers independent of the online
company. eBay will be used as a case study to analyze how online
companies facilitating transactions, by providing a forum to sell
goods, are treated by the American and French legal systems. The
illustration of the two legal systems' treatments of eBay will take
place through an analysis of Tiffany v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay.
Part I of this Comment will examine eBay, providing background
and information on the company, as well as the problems eBay has
faced with regards to counterfeits. This section will also discuss
safeguards eBay has implemented to prevent the sale of counterfeit
goods on their website. Part II will provide an analysis of Tiffany v.
eBay, including what rules and facts the court applied in reaching their
decision in favor of the Internet giant. Part III focuses on LVMH v.
eBay, discussing how and why the French court came to their decision
against eBay. This section will also introduce how LVMH v. eBay
differs from Tiffany v. eBay, including the laws applied and additional
16. See Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id-article=2354 (note: Christian
Dior Couture is one of several companies in the LVMH Group that brought a
lawsuit against eBay. For this Comment's purposes, those cases will collectively be
referred to as LVMH v. eBay in the text); Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at
26.
17. Sara George, eBay Fined in Paris, Vindicated in NY-What Now For
'Genuine Fakes'?, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Aug. 27, 2008,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=64862&login=true&nogo=1 .
18. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2008). The Lanham Act deals
with trademark liability and unfair competition issues.
4
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considerations that resulted in differing decisions in substantially
similar cases.
Part IV of the Comment will provide a more detailed comparison
of the two cases and the rationales behind the decisions. Additionally,
there will be an analysis into how the business implications presented
by these decisions and how the treatment of trademark laws affect e-
commerce as a whole. Part V will conclude the Comment with a
discussion of Internet laws and will offer a proposed legislative
pattern for various countries to adopt to improve the state of
trademark law, with respect to the Internet and e-commerce.
I. EBAY, E-COMMERCE, AND POTENTIAL COUNTERFEIT LIABILITY FOR
PURELY E-COMMERCE ENTITIES
The rise of e-commerce brings the potential for counterfeit
liability. Based on the design of the Internet, the liability is not limited
to the counterfeiters, but may be applied to website hosts as well.
Tiffany v. eBay presents one example of the counterfeit liability faced
by a company operating a website centered in e-commerce.
A. eBay
eBay allows sellers to sell goods directly to buyers.1 9 The
innovation of an "on-line flea market" 20 has brought eBay great
success; more than six million new listings appear on eBay daily, and
generally eBay features one hundred million listings every day.21
Further, eBay's earnings continue to increase, with the company
earning a profit of $460 million dollars in April 2008, an increase of
$83 million over the previous year. 22 Not surprisingly, eBay is known
as "The World's Online Marketplace." 23
19. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
20. Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites From The
Counterfeiting Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany, Inc.
v. eBay, Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 913 (2005) ("[eBay] provides a
virtual space where sellers and buyers can meet, much like a flea market, with some
of the characteristics of classified advertisements and auctions.").
21. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
22. Amanda Fehd, eBay Profits Beats Wall Street's Expectations,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/16
/ebay-profits-beat-wall-st n_97092.html; see also Catherine Holahan, eBay's
20091
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In essence, eBay serves as a facilitator, connecting buyers and
sellers who carry out transactions between each other directly. 24 In
order to create a listing, buyers and sellers register with eBay, thus
becoming members.25 The sellers create sales listings for their item(s),
which range from antiques to college textbooks. 26 Sellers, per the user
agreement, are responsible not only for the content of the listing,
including the title and description, but also the price the item is
eventually sold for.27
"While eBay provides the venue for the sale and support for the
transaction, [eBay] does not itself sell the items [and the] items sold
on eBay are never in eBay's physical possession." 28 For each posted
item, the sellers pay an initial insertion fee, and for every successful
sale, the sellers pay a final value fee based on the final sale price of
the item.29 The final fee of the item may range from 5.25% to 10% of
the item's final selling price.30 Overall, eBay exercises some control
over the items, not only through the profits derived, but also through
eBay's retained authority to take disciplinary action against a seller
who violates eBay's terms or the conditions of eBay's User
Agreement. 31
Changing Identity, Bus. WK., Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/
print/technology/content/apr2007/tc20070423_039758.htm (stating that in 2007,
eBay earned $377 million dollars, a 52% increase over the previous year).
23. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 913.
24. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
25. See id. at 474.
26. See Sunderji, supra note 20, at 912-13; Holahan, supra note 22 ("In its
television ads, eBay describes itself as the place to get 'it', whatever it may be. The
company deliberately leaves 'it' undefined to emphasize the immense variety of
goods available for auction on its site.").
27. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
28. Id. at 475.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 476.
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B. eBay's Counterfeiting Challenges and Company-Implemented
Safeguards
From its inception, eBay appreciated the potentially high risk
posed by listings of counterfeit objects on the eBay website. 32 For the
first decade of its existence, eBay asked companies to monitor
auctions of their products and to notify eBay of fraudulent items. 33
This frustrated rights-owners, those that own the right to a copyright
or trademark, because eBay's request meant they had to use their own
resources in policing the website. 34 This frustration only increased
"when counterfeiting exploded after the company expanded to China
in 2004."" 5
To help balance out the interests of both the rights-owners and
eBay members, eBay took further proactive steps to prevent
counterfeit items from being sold.36 eBay limited the number of items
that sellers in certain categories, such as luxury goods, could sell.37
The company prevented sellers from holding shorter one-day auctions,
a tactic used by fraudulent sellers hoping to take the money and
disappear. 38 eBay also established geographical restrictions that
prevented sellers in certain countries, such as China and Hong Kong,
from listing items in critical categories at all. 39 Finally, eBay "began
delaying some listings from being published to the site to give its
employees time to review the items. 4 °
32. Doreen Carvajal, eBay Ordered to Pay $61 Million in Sale of Counterfeit
Goods, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C. ("For the first decade of its existence, eBay
tried to avoid the counterfeiting problem ... .
33. Id.
34. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (discussing that if a rights-owner
"possessed a good faith belief that the item infringed on a copyright or a trademark"
they could take some steps to protect their product by submitting a Notice of
Claimed Infringement to eBay and then eBay would remove the challenged listing
from its website); Carvajal, supra note 32.
35. Carvajal, supra note 32.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
2009]
7
Bailey: Fighting an Anonymous Enemy: The Uncertainty of Auction Sites in
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
136 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
Each year eBay invests upwards of $20 million on tools to help
"promote trust and safety on its website," and has allocated
approximately one quarter of its work staff to help achieve these
goals.41 In 2007 alone, eBay reportedly suspended approximately
"50,000 sellers and blocked 40,000 previously suspended sellers from
returning to the service." 42 Additionally, eBay has taken steps to help
protect against fraud by implementing both a fraud engine that
automatically searches for violations of eBay's policies, as well as the
Verified Rights Owner ("VeRO") Program that allows rights-owners
to report any potentially infringing listing.43 While an important step
towards preventing fraudulent sales, eBay, through VeRO, continues
to place the responsibility of policing trademarks on the individual
companies and dealers.44
Undoubtedly, while some will argue these safeguards
implemented by eBay are adequate protection, these measures were
not sufficient to keep eBay from being drawn into litigation by several
luxury goods companies. 45
II. TIFFANY INC. v. EBAY INC.
In 2004, Tiffany instituted action against eBay, alleging, among
other claims, that eBay was liable for both direct and contributory
trademark infringement involving counterfeit marks. 46 In 2008, the
41. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
42. Carvajal, supra note 32.
43. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
44. Id.
45. See eBay is Sunk in Lawsuits: LVMH, Skpe ... Who else?, ECOMMERCE
JOURNAL, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/news/
18268_ebay-is-sued-by-bothjlvmhgroup-and-skype?drgn=2; Carol Matlack,
Hermes Beats eBay in Counterfeit Case, Bus. WK., June 6, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/print/globalbiz/content/jun2008/gb2008066-845380.
htm [hereinafter Matlack, Hermes Beats eBay] (discussing the lawsuits brought by
Tiffany and LVMH).
46. Complaint at 45, 49, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 2004 WL 1413904
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 04 CV 4607); see also Jason Kessler, Correcting the Standard
for Contributory Trademark Liability Over the Internet, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 375, 379 (2006) (quoting the United States Patent and Trademark Office)
("[A] trademark is a 'word, phrase, symbol, or design, or combination of words,
phrases, symbols, or designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the
goods of one party from those of others."').
8
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case went to bench trial before the United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York.47
A. Tiffany & Co.
Part of the case's significance arises from the prominence of its
litigants. While eBay is a relatively new and highly successful
company based on its profits and the impressive number of
transactions facilitated over its website,4 8 Tiffany is noteworthy
because of the Company's rich history and reputation for producing
pristine products. 49 Tiffany is a 170 year-old corporation, famous for
high-end jewelry and home items. 50 In order to protect the
corporation's clientele and public image, Tiffany has two marks
registered at the United States Patent and Trademark Office: a kidney-
shaped design and a cross design.51
Tiffany takes procedural steps to ensure that the quality of jewelry
sent into the market is of a certain caliber.52 Tiffany quality control
personnel inspect the Tiffany merchandise before releasing it for
distribution. 53 Tiffany also does not make its quality standards
available to the public or other jewelry manufacturers. 54 Finally,
Tiffany closely controls the distribution of Tiffany-branded goods; the
only way in which Tiffany sells "significant quantities of merchandise
at discounted or wholesale prices," is through sales to corporate and
international trade accounts.5 5 However, counterfeiting remains a huge
problem with the sale of Tiffany products over the Internet, despite the
efforts of both Tiffany and eBay. 56
47. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
48. See Holahan, supra note 22 (discussing eBay's growth and profits).
49. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 471-72 ("The protection of the quality and integrity of the brand and
the trademarks is critical to Tiffany's success as a retailer of luxury goods.").
52. Id. at 472 (discussing how Tiffany, to maintain its reputation, has its
control personnel inspect the merchandise and closely control the distribution of its
goods).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 473.
56. See discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing eBay's efforts to prevent sales of
2009]
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B. Case Background
Along with the direct trademark infringement claim, Tiffany v.
eBay presented an issue of first impression for the United States courts
regarding whether an online auction site could be held contributorily
liable for trademark infringement perpetrated by third-party sellers.57
The dispute between these two corporations arose from over six
hundred "enforcement actions," taken by Tiffany in conjunction with
law enforcement, against individual eBay sellers of counterfeit
Tiffany items. 58 These actions consisted of customs seizures, as well
as working with law enforcement and demanding that individuals stop
selling counterfeit Tiffany items.59 In 2003, Tiffany wrote to eBay
informing them that counterfeit Tiffany jewelry was being sold on
eBay. 60 Tiffany's fears of counterfeiting were reinforced and eBay
became apprised to the severity of the counterfeiting problem when
buyers complained to both companies about the counterfeit items.61
Once alerted to the counterfeit items, eBay took several steps to
address the problem. 62 eBay removed the offensive listings. 63 eBay
also took, according to this court, "appropriate steps" in warning and
suspending the sellers.64 Moreover, eBay took specific measures to
stop the future sale of counterfeit Tiffany items. 65 This included
adding a special warning message to sellers who wished to sell a
Tiffany item and implementing a Tiffany-specific filter in its fraud
engine that searched for any term including "Tiffany" in the listing.66
Nevertheless, Tiffany sued eBay, alleging direct and contributory
infringement, because eBay assisted third parties in making the sale
counterfeit goods).
57. See Sunderji, supra note 20, at 931.
58. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 487.
62. Id. at 482 ("At trial, Tiffany's CEO, Michael Kowalski, conceded that in
'virtually all cases or certainly the majority of cases eBay would take down the
listings for any auctions that were identified by Tiffany as suspect."').
63. Id. at 487-88.
64. Id.at488-91.
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id.
10
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and profited from the sale. 67 Specifically, Tiffany contended that eBay
was responsible for the listings that contained Tiffany items, and eBay
had notice that a problem existed, which legally obligated them to
investigate and control the illegal activity.
68
Both businesses share a common interest in eliminating
counterfeit merchandise; Tiffany wants to protect the Tiffany brand
name, while eBay wishes to preserve the reputation of the
merchandise the company sells. 69 The dispute lies with whether eBay
or Tiffany holds the burden of policing trademarks in Internet
commerce.
70
C. Issues Presented and Case Analysis
Although Tiffany stated various claims against eBay, this
Comment only addresses those arguments involving trademark
infringement. First, Tiffany alleged that eBay directly infringed on
Tiffany in violation of federal law, under certain provisions of the
Lanham Act.71 The Lanham Act provides that the owner of a mark
that is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
can bring a civil suit against a person who has used the mark without
the owner's consent.72 The Act defines "person" as those who may be
held liable for trademark infringement. 73 In order to prevail on a
trademark infringement claim, Tiffany needed to establish that a valid
mark existed, the mark was entitled to protection, eBay used the mark
in commerce, in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or
services, and did so without the Tiffany's consent.74 Tiffany asserted
that eBay used Tiffany marks when it advertised the availability of
Tiffany items.7
5
67. Id. at 470.
68. Id. at 469.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 493-94.
72. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2008) (cited in Tiffany, 576 F.
Supp. 2d at 491).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (2006); 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and
Tradenames § 131 (2009).
74. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
75. Id.
2009]
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Second, and more central to this discussion, Tiffany claimed that
eBay contributed to third party infringement under federal and
common law.76 Although not explicitly provided by the statutory
scheme of the Lanham Act, courts have recognized a claim for
contributory infringement.77 The Tiffany court cited the leading United
States Supreme Court case78 on the issue which held:
If a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit. '79 The
Supreme Court's decision in Inwood empowered trademark owners
to effectively police their marks.80 Generally, contributory
trademark liability only applies "if a defendant (1) intentionally
induces another to infringe on a trademark, or (2) continues to
supply the infringing product knowing the recipient will use the
product to engage in trademark infringement.8 1
Because eBay did not intentionally infringe on the Tiffany marks, 82
Tiffany had to prove that eBay knew, or had reason to know, of the
infringement. 83
76. Id. at 501.
77. Id.
78. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
Inwood expanded the test of contributory trademark liability such that a
manufacturer or distributor can be held liable if it induces another party to infringe a
trademark or if it continues to supply its product to a party whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.
Kessler, supra note 46, at 381. In Inwood, the plaintiff brought suit claiming that the
defendant's use of look-alike capsules and catalog entries induced pharmacists to
mislabel the plaintiffs drugs, thereby infringing on its trademark. Id. at 382. The
Supreme Court held in favor of the defendants because the defendants were not
intentionally inducing the pharmacists and did not continue to supply the drugs once
it learned of the error. Id.
79. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (citing Inwood Labs. Inc., 456 U.S. at 854).
80. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 920.
81. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996);
74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 131 (2009).
82. See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502 ("Tiffany has not alleged that eBay
12
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In addition, Tiffany argued that eBay was "willfully blind' 84 to
the infringement, "[b]ecause willful blindness equals actual
knowledge for the purpose of the Lanham Act."85 The term "willfully
blind" describes a situation where a person purposefully fails to
investigate the supposed infringement in an attempt to avoid
knowledge and wrongdoing. 86 In addition to the knowledge
requirements, under the Inwood test, Tiffany, as the distributor or
manufacturer, had to show that eBay continued to supply Tiffany
products to the infringer. 87
The court found that eBay was not liable for infringement on
Tiffany's trademark.88 With regard to Tiffany's direct infringement
claim, the court found that eBay's uses of the marks were protected by
the doctrine of nominative fair use.89 Nominative fair use allows a
defendant to "use a plaintiff's trademark to identify the plaintiff's
goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the source
of the defendant's product . ,,90 eBay was protected under the
nominative fair use doctrine because: (1) the products in question,
mainly jewelry, were not readily identifiable without the use of
Tiffany marks; (2) eBay only used the Tiffany marks when reasonably
necessary to identify the product; and (3) eBay did nothing to suggest
it was sponsored or endorsed by Tiffany.9' Moreover, Tiffany
presented little evidence suggesting eBay's use of the Tiffany marks
led customers to believe that Tiffany itself was selling jewelry on
eBay.92
In response to Tiffany's second argument, the court found that
eBay had not contributorially infringed on Tiffany's marks. 93 The
intentionally induced infringement of Tiffany's marks.").
83. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 933.
84. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
85. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 933; Kessler, supra note 46, at 399.
86. Kessler, supra note 46, at 399.
87. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)).
88. Id. at 470.
89. Id. at 496.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 496-97.
92. Id. at 498.
93. Id. at 501.
2009]
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court stated that eBay is a "service," not a product,94 providing the
necessary marketplace for counterfeiting, by supplying the software to
upload the listing information and actively facilitating transactions.
95
The court also analyzed whether eBay had direct control over the
means of the infringement, using the test from Inwood.96 Central to
Tiffany's contributory infringement claim was proving eBay had
knowledge or reason to know of the direct infringement.97 The court
found that "neither precedent nor policy support[ed] Tiffany's
contention that generalized allegations of infringement provide[d
defendants[, eBay,] with knowledge or a reason to know of the
infringement. 98 In reaching this conclusion, the court looked at the
plain language of the Inwood test,99 as well as other courts' previous
holdings.100 Overall, the court found that eBay's generalized
knowledge of infringement did not require eBay to remove all Tiffany
listings or discontinue its service to all those who might be engaged in
counterfeiting. 1
01
In essence, a plaintiff must show that a defendant knew or had
reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement, instead of
just generalized information. 10 2 As Tiffany failed to make this
94. Id. at 506.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 507.
97. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 933.
98. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
99. Id. at 508 ("The plain language of Inwood states that the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily liable when 'it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement."'
(quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)); see also
id. ("The Supreme Court's focus on individual infringers through its singular
language is consistent with a requirement of specific, rather than general,
knowledge.").
100. Id. ("[A]t least one district court in this circuit to address this issue has
held that 'trademark plaintiffs bear a high burden in establishing 'knowledge' of
contributory infringement."' (citing Gucci America Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 409, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); id. ("[C]ourts have been reluctant to extend
contributory trademark liability to defendants where there is some uncertainty as to
the extent or the nature of the infringement.").
101. Id.at5ll.
102. See id. at 508 (eBay's "generalized knowledge is insufficient under the
Inwood test to impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem."); see
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol40/iss1/6
THE UNCERTAINTY OF AUCTION SITES
showing, it did not prove the knowledge requirement under the
Inwood test.10 3 Since eBay took necessary and reasonable steps to stop
the infringement when alerted, eBay was not found to be willfully
blind to the infringement.10 4 "Willful blindness must be based on the
actual state of mind of the defendant, and not on whether there was
control or monitoring."' 0 5 Here, the evidence established that eBay
took reasonable steps to investigate and stop the wrongful conduct
when it had general knowledge of the counterfeiting. 10 6 All of these
factors led the court to conclude that eBay was not guilty of
contributory infringement. 10 7
This issue sparked a great deal of controversy, even before the
trial had begun. 0 8 Many focused on how the court's ruling would
affect Internet businesses and trademark rights. 0 9 The court
also id. at 510 ("Given the presence of authentic goods on eBay, it therefore cannot
be said that generalized knowledge of counterfeiting is sufficient to impute
knowledge to eBay of any specific acts of actual infringement.").
103. See id. at513.
104. Id. at 515. "Were Tiffany to prevail on its argument that eBay was
willfully blind, the 'reason to know' standard of the Inwood test would be inflated
into an affirmative duty to take precautions against potential counterfeiters, even
when eBay had no specific knowledge of the individual counterfeiters." Id.
105. Kessler, supra note 46, at 400.
106. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
107. See id. at 518 (the court stated: "(1) eBay exerted sufficient control over
its website such that the Inwood test applies; (2) under the Inwood test, the
appropriate measure is whether eBay knew or had reason to know of, not whether
eBay could reasonably anticipate, the infringement; (3) generalized knowledge is
insufficient to impute knowledge of any and all instances of infringing activity to
eBay; (4) Tiffany's demand letters, the Buying Programs, and the volume of NOCI
reporting provided only generalized knowledge to eBay, which is insufficient to
establish a duty to act; (5) eBay was not willfully blind to infringement; (6) when
eBay had knowledge of specific infringing listings, eBay promptly terminated those
listings; (7) when eBay had knowledge that a seller was repeatedly engaging in
counterfeit activity, eBay's pattern was to suspend that seller and then take further
corrective action; and finally, (8) to the extent Tiffany challenges the VeRO
Program on the grounds that it is too timeconsuming [sic], the burden of policing the
Tiffany mark appropriately rests with Tiffany.").
108. See Farmer, supra note 4 (discussing the pro-brand maker perspective
and the pro-eBay perspective of the argument).
109. See, e.g., Sunderji, supra note 20, at 940 ("More importantly, the policy
arguments on both sides reveal two unacceptable resolutions to the problem. If
Tiffany prevails, eBay in its current state, cannot continue to exist .... On the other
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recognized these competing interests, mentioning the potential
business implications several times during the case, as well as the
interplay between business interests and current trademark laws.1 10
The court implied that the traditional black-book trademark law
should be amended to help deal with Internet situations such as this
one. The court explained that while it "is sympathetic to Tiffany's
frustrations... the fact remains that rights holders bear the principal
responsibility to police their trademarks.""'1 The court hints in its
opinion that the current law is inadequate: "The Court is not
unsympathetic to Tiffany and other rights owners who have invested
enormous resources in developing their brands, only to see them
illicitly and efficiently exploited by others on the Internet.
Nevertheless, the law is clear .... ,112
The court seemed to be concerned about the possible business
implications to both parties if Tiffany were to prevail. 113 Indeed, the
pro-business point of view regarding e-commerce appeared to prevail
throughout the court's opinion. For example, in the court's analysis of
contributory infringement, it stated, "[w]ere Tiffany to prevail on its
argument that generalized statements of infringement were sufficient
to impute knowledge to eBay of any and all infringing acts, Tiffany's
rights in its mark would dramatically expand, potentially stifling
legitimate sales of Tiffany goods on eBay."' 14 Such statements,
together with those mentioned above, make this case an interesting
hand, if eBay triumphs, trademark infringement on the Internet will likely increase,
giving rise to more consumer confusion and a decrease in the goodwill of many
trademarks." (citations omitted)).
110. Tiffany, 576 Supp. 2d at 526 ("The rapid development of the Internet and
websites like eBay have created new ways for sellers and buyers to connect to each
other and to expand their businesses beyond geographical limits. These new markets
have also, however, given counterfeiters new opportunities to expand their reach.
The Court is not unsympathetic to Tiffany and other rights owners who have
invested enormous resources in developing their brands, only to see them illicitly
and efficiently exploited by others on the Internet. Nevertheless, the law is clear: it is
the trademark owner's burden to police its mark, and companies like eBay cannot be
held liable for trademark infringement based solely on their generalized knowledge
that trademark infringement might be occurring on their websites.").
111. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
112. Id.at 527.
113. Id.
114. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
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example of how the court interjected its own rationale into the
decision.
Overall, it appears that the court's message is that the current laws
governing trademarks, particularly the Lanham Act, do not adequately
cover situations arising within the cyber context. One must be
conscious of the business implications and dangers that may go along
with a ruling that an online business can no longer sell items
belonging to rights-owners. A new trademarks law should be drafted
that deals specifically with the Internet. This new law should balance
the rights and responsibilities of the rights-owners with those of the
on-line businesses so that both receive some protection. By drafting
such a law, both trademark holders and Internet business owners
would receive some satisfaction.115
Tiffany v. eBay essentially placed the primary responsibility on the
distributor to prevent fraudulent peer-to-peer sales online, while also
recognizing that the facilitator of those peer-to-peer sales also bears
some responsibility within the framework of the existing laws.
Another interesting issue this case raises is "whether luxury goods
companies should be able to limit the selling of their goods between
consumers" and not just businesses.1 6 Almost simultaneously to when
the Southern District of New York was hearing Tiffany v. eBay, a
French court heard substantially similar claims brought against eBay,
by LVMH, another luxury goods maker. 117
III. LVMH v. EBAY
Although Tiffany v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay contain substantially
similar facts and address virtually parallel claims against eBay, the
French court ruled against eBay. 118 Perhaps more striking, this
115. See discussion infra Part V.
116. George, supra note 17.
117. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3 ?idarticle=2354.
118. Id. (in French: "Par ces motifs, Le Tribunal statuant publiquement par
jugement contradictoire en premier ressor... Constate que les societes eBay Inc. Et
eBay International AG ont commiss des fautes graves en manquant a leur obligation
de s'assurer que leur activite ne generait pas des actes illicites au prejudice de la
societe Christian Dior Couture, Dit que ces manquements ont ete prejudiciables a la
societe Christian Dior Couture et necessitent reparation") (translated into English by
2009]
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decision marked the third ruling in a two year period from a French
court where eBay was held liable for facilitating the sale of counterfeit
goods. 119 The decision in LVMH v. eBay, when considered with the
contradictory American ruling in favor of the Internet company, will
likely enlarge this growing controversy.
A. LVMH
LVMH is the world's largest luxury goods corporation, 120 with
brands ranging "from [Louis] Vuitton and Christian Dior to Fendi and
Guerlain perfumes."' 2 1 Moet Hennessy and Louis Vuitton merged in
1987 to form LVMH. 122 When the merger occurred, LVMH assumed
its place in a lineage of businesses that has produced products such as
champagne, leather goods, and cosmetics.1 23 The House of Louis
Vuitton was founded in 1854 and several of the companies which
form the LVMH group today are centuries old. 124 Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin dates back to 1772, Hennessy to 1765, and Chateau
d'Yquem as far back as 1593.125
author: "For these reasons, the Court ruling publicly adversarial trial in the first
instance . . . recognizes that companies eBay Inc. And ebay International AG have
committed serious misconduct by failing in their obigation to ensure that their
activity does not generate illegal acts to the detriment of the company Christian Dior
Couture, said that these failure were prejudicial to the company Christian Dior
Couture and require repair.").
119. Catherine Holahan & Carol Matlack, eBay Gets Buffeted in Europe, Bus.
WK., July 1, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com
/technology/content/jun2008/tc20080630_374448.htm?chan=top+news-top+news+i
ndexnews+%2B+analysis [hereinafter Holahan & Matlack].
120. eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged, ECONOMIST, June 19, 2008, available
at http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story-id= 11580287
[hereinafter eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged].
121. Carol Matlack, LVMH v. eBay: A Counterfeit Suit, Bus. WK., Sept. 22,
2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content
/sep2006/gb20060922_888836.htm?chan=top+news-top+news+index__global+busin
ess [hereinafter Matlack, LVMH v. eBay].
122. LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Historical Background,
http://www.lvmh.com/print.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page=pg-faq-histo.asp (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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LVMH has always taken counterfeiting very seriously, almost
personally. 126 In recent years, LVMH has become even more
aggressive in protecting its brand. 127 LVMH employs investigators
worldwide that scour auction websites for fakes, and regularly alerts
eBay of fraudulent items. 128 On its website, LVMH notes the closing
of several plants and stores that offered counterfeit products, as well
as the dismantling of networks that manufacture counterfeit products,
particularly in Asia. 129 In France, police operations ending in the arrest
of vendors of counterfeit products have "helped to raise the awareness
of the public to the fact that buying counterfeit products is also
illegal."' 30 In addition, LVMH has initiated a proactive policy to
inform the general public about enforcing anti-counterfeit measures to
render those measures more efficient and effective. 131
B. Case Background and Arguments
LVMH v. eBay originated as three separate suits brought by
various LVMH companies that were joined due to the similarity of
facts and legal issues each case presented. 132 LVMH is a fashion
group containing several high profile companies, including Christian
Dior.133 LVMH brought suit against eBay, claiming 90% of the Louis
Vuitton bags and Dior perfumes sold on eBay's website were
126. See LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Brand Protection,
http://www.lvmh.com/print.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page=pg-fa qjlutte.asp& (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009) ("The luxury industry is particularly hard-hit by the
counterfeiting of goods, which unlawfully takes advantage of the prestige of its
brands and harms their tradition, identity, and image.").
127. See Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121.
128. Id.
129. See LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Brand Protection,
http://www.lvmh.cornprint.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page=pg-faq-lutte.asp& (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009).
130. Id.
131. See id. (discussing LVMH's anti-counterfeiting measures).
132. LVMH v. eBay: Paris' Tribunal de Commerce Holds eBay Liable, LUXE
CHRONICLES, June 30, 2008, http://www.theluxechronicles.com
/theluxechronicles/2008/06/after-two-long.html.
133. LVMH.com, http://www.lvmh.com (follow "The Group"; then follow
"LVMH Companies and Brands"; then follow "Fashion & Leather Goods" and
"Perfumes and Cosmetics") (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
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counterfeit. 134 Specifically, LVMH alleged in its complaint "that of
the 300,000 Dior-branded items and 150,000 Vuitton bags offered on
eBay during the first six months of [2006], 90% were fakes."' 35
LVMH filed suit in Paris Commercial Court seeking €50 million in
damages. 136 LVMH alleged two main claims: (1) that eBay committed
"serious errors" by not doing enough to prevent the sales of fake
goods, including Louis Vuitton bags and Christian Dior products; and
(2) that eBay allowed the sale of perfume brands owned by LVMH,
such as Christian Dior and Givenchy that were unauthorized by the
company. 137 LVMH argued that even if the perfumes were real, the
sale of the perfumes on eBay's website "violated Christian Dior's
distribution network which only allowed sales through specialist
dealers."' 3
8
In its defense, eBay asserted that only the brand owner can "truly
and effectively police its own brand."1 39 eBay called LVMH's lawsuit
an "abdication of its responsibility."'' 40 Arguing it was a "host for
independent vendors," eBay further claimed it had limited
responsibility and capacity to regulate what their members sell. 141
Such a classification would allow eBay to fit under the European E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, 142 which states that a passive
provider of "host" services is generally not considered responsible for
its users. 143 The Directive defines a service provider as "any person
134. Carvajal, supra note 32.
135. Matlack, LVMHv. eBay, supra note 121.
136. Angelique Chrisafis, eBay hit with £30m fine for sales of fake luxuries,
GUARDIAN, July 1, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business
/2008/jul/10/ebay.hitechcrime.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121.
140. Id.
141. Chrisafis, supra note 136.
142. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC), available at
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031 :EN:HTML).
143. See Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 13-14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC)
("Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of
information provided by a recipient of the service .... the service provider is not
liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on
condition that: (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge . . . ; or (b) the
20
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providing an information society service." 144 On a less substantive
level, eBay also argued that French courts lack the jurisdiction to
impose their "unusually restrictive commercial regulations" on
worldwide commerce. 145 eBay contended, "[s]uccess in fighting
counterfeits depends on the joint effort and cooperation between
[itself], the rights owners, and law enforcement."' 146
C. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S DECISION
On June 30, 2008, the Tribunal de Commerce in Paris held that
eBay's sites were subject to French law because eBay's websites were
accessible from France. 147 "The ruling applies to all eBay sites
worldwide to the extent that they are accessible from France, and not
merely to the company's French site ... "148 The court then addressed
how eBay is classified under French law. 149 European E-Commerce
Directive 2000/3 1/EC offers an exemption for host liability in cases in
which the host lacks knowledge of the illegal information uploaded to
its system, so long as the host removes or blocks the illegal
information upon becoming aware of it.150 The Directive also states:
provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information."); see also Roger Parloff, eBay
Scrambles to Reverse Loss in LVMH Case, LEGAL PAD, July 9, 2008,
http://legalpad.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/09/eBay-scrambles-to-reverse-loss-
in-lvmh-case/.
144. Parloff, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121.
147. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354 (in French: "des
lors qu'un site internet est accessible au public frangais, les tribunaux franqais sont
compdtents pour rdparer le dommage rdalis6 en France, ce qui est le cas des sites
eBay ainsi que le constate le Tribunal.") (translated into English by author: "[W]hen
a website is accessible to the public French, French courts are compentent to repair
the damage done in France, which is where site eBay [is accessible] and the
Tribunal finds.").
148. See Parloff, supra note 143.
149. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354.
150. Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 13-14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC); see
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"[h]osting providers cannot be obligated to actively search for illegal
content uploaded by their customers."' 
51
The Directive applies only to service providers within the
European Union. 152 "The E-commerce Directive defines hosting
services as services that consist of the storage of information provided
by a service recipient."1 53 The court, in applying this definition, found
eBay functioned, not as a "passive host," but rather as an "active
broker" because eBay plays an active role in facilitating sales and
profits from the sales. 154 Further, the court focused on eBay's
"acknowledge[ment] that fraud exists" by "constantly reminding users
to its sites [to] respect the law and regulations in force" including the
VERO program.1 55 Based on these findings, the Tribunal de
Commerce in Paris classified eBay as a broker and not a "simple
technical provider." 15 6 The court acknowledged eBay's role as a
service provider but said that its roles of service provider and broker
supra note 143 and accompanying text.
151. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
152. Thomas Livolsi, Comment, Scope of E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC
of June 8, 2000, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 473, 475-76 (2001).
153. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
154. Parloff, supra note 143.
155. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354 (in French:
"Attendu cependant que eBay reconnaft que les fraudes existent, sont importantes et
doivent 8tre combattues, quelle ddclare participer pleinement A la lutte contre la
contrefaqon en rappelant sans cesse aux utilisateurs de ses sites le respect de la loi et
des r~glements en vigueur, en ayant mis en place un syst~me intitul6 'Vero' qui est
un 'programme d'aide la protection de la propridt6 intellectuelle."') (translated into
English by author: "Considering, however, that eBay acknowledges that fraud
exists, is important and must be combated, which states participate fully in the fight
against counterfeiting by constantly reminding users to its sites respect the law and
regulations in force, having been a system called 'Vero' is an 'aid program for the
protection of intellectual property."').
156. Id. (discussing eBay as "a.site broker" that is an "intermediary between
buyers and sellers, as eBay is developing tools specifically designed to ensure the
promotion and development of sales on its sites.") (in French: eBay est
l'intermddiation entre vendeurs et acheteurs, que eBay met en place des outils
destines spdcifiquement A assurer la promotion et le ddveloppement des ventes sur
ses sites A travers ); Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
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are "indivisible."' 57 The court decided to hold eBay responsible for
illegal activity of others conducted on its website because eBay
directly profits from the sales and fees charged.'58
Further, the court found eBay liable for negligence based on
"illicit sale of perfumes" and for not adequately preventing
counterfeiting on its website.159 The court found that eBay had "made
serious mistakes," and had failed to fulfill its obligations to ensure that
sales on their website were legal. 160 "The court concluded that eBay
was not doing enough to combat counterfeit sales and should be
forcing sellers to post more product information to guarantee
authenticity." 161 The court made the ruling because,
[I]t appear[ed] that the responsibility of eBay is significant as it has
deliberately refused to put in place effective and appropriate
measures to fight against counterfeiting, such as those of requiring
sellers to provide on request the invoice or a certificate of
authenticity of products sold, to punish any vendor['s] wrongdoing
permanently closing its account from the finding of fault, to
immediately remove illegal ads reports to the services of the
company Christian Dior Couture loaded the fight against
counterfeiting. 1
62
157. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354.
158. Holahan & Matlack, supra note 119.
159. Pierre-Antoine Souchard, France Faults eBay Over Fake Goods, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2008, at D08.
160. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2354 (in French:
"Attendu que eBay a bien commis de graves fautes") (translated into English by
author: "Considering that eBay has made serious mistakes").
161. Carvajal, supra note 32. "According to the court, eBay should instead use
all means to force sellers to extensively identify the items put up for sale with
information such as the product code, serial number, type indications, authenticity
certificate, etc." Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
162. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354 (in French:
Attendu qu'il apparaft que ]a responsabilit6 de eBay est d'autant plus importante
qu'elle a d6lib6r6ment refus6 de mettre en place les mesures efficaces et appropri6es
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As a result of these findings, the Tribunal de Commerce of Paris
entered judgment against eBay, ordering it to pay LVMH $61
million.' 63 The court authorized distribution of the monetary penalty
to Louis Vuitton, Dior Couture, Dior Parfums, Kenzo, Givenchy, and
Guerlain. 164 The large penalty may have come as a surprise to many,
because French courts rarely make large damage awards in
lawsuits. 165 In addition, eBay was enjoined from the sale of any
LVMH perfumes on its website. 166 The injunction requires eBay to
block not only all sales of counterfeit LVMH products on its website,
but also to block all sales of genuine perfumes by unauthorized
dealers. 167 Further, the injunction applies to all eBay websites
worldwide, not just its French website. 168 To enforce compliance with
this injunction, the court will penalize eBay C50,000, or roughly
$78,000, each day it does not remove LVMH products from its
website. 169
eBay stated its intention to fight the ruling, saying it refuses to
comply with this "totally ridiculous" decision. 170 eBay claimed that
large luxury goods companies, such as LVMH, use counterfeiting as a
"stalking horse" to attack online commerce in order to "keep a
stranglehold of sales outlets to the detriment of consumers."' 17
1
pour lutter contre la contrefagon, comme celles consistant A imposer aux vendeurs
de fournir sur simple demande la facture d'achat ou un certificat d'authenticit6 des
produits mis en vente, A sanctionner tout vendeur fautif en fermant drfinitivement
son compte d~s la constatation de la faute, A retirer immddiatement les annonces
illicites signalres par les services de la socidtd Christian Dior Couture chargds de la
lutte contre la contrefaqon,).
163. Souchard, supra note 159, at D08.
164. eBay Punished for Fake Goods Sales, CONNEXION, July 1, 2008,
http://www.connexionfrance.com/news-articles.php?id=229 [hereinafter eBay
Punished for Fake Goods Sales].
165. See Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121.
166. Parloff, supra note 143.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Holahan & Matlack, supra note 119.
170. Id.
171. Chrisafis, supra note 136; see also Andrew Charlesworth, eBay Slams
European 'Digital Protectionism', V3.CO.UK, June 24, 2008,
http://www.vnuenet.com/vnunet/news/2219890/e-bay-european-ecommerce
("[e]Bay is lobbying the European Parliament today to outlaw what it calls a culture
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LVMH, on the other hand, lauded the ruling: "Until now, eBay hid
behind its status as a host site. They gambled on this defence [sic]
[and lost].' 172 LVMH said the decision was "crucial for the creative
industry and 'protected brands by considering them an important part
of French heritage."' 17
3
eBay requested a stay for the injunctive portion of the ruling from
the French Court of Appeals in order to avoid paying the daily fine
imposed.1 74 eBay stated a delay of the injunction for four months was
the "necessary minimum to implement the technical and human means
which [it] has to try and carry out the pronounced injunctions."'1 75
Specifically, eBay argued that the "state of technology" was not
capable of filtering all the sales in an absolute way, and that the
injunction hindered access to human rights and fundamental
freedom. 176 The court rejected eBay's arguments and declined to stay
the injunction. 177 As a result of the court's rejection, eBay may next
of 'digital protectionism' in Europe.").
172. eBay Punished for Fake Goods Sales, supra note 164; see also Matlack,
LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121 ("eBay's longstanding practice of letting buyers and
sellers make deals on its site with minimal supervision by the company.").
173. Chrisafis, supra note 136.
174. Cour d'appeal [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, l'ere chambre, July
11, 2008, available at http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-
decision.php3?idarticle=2372 (in French: "Arreter l'exdcution provisoire
prononcde par le jugement du tribunal de commerce de Paris du 30 juin 2008 en ce
qu'il a....").
175. Id. (in French: "ce ddlai constituant le minimum indispensable pour
mettre en oeuvre les moyens techniques et humains dont elle dispose pour tenter
d'exdcuter les injonctions prononcdes.").
176. Id. (in French: "Que, compte tenu de 1'6tat de la technologie A ce jour et
des moyens techniques dont elles disposent, elles ne sont pas en mesure de filtrer de
mani~re absolue toutes les annonces visdes par les injonctions ;Que l'impossibilit6
technique d'exrcuter A titre provisoire les injonctions a dgalement de graves
consdquences car elle entrave leur acc~s au juge d'appel, pourtant garanti par
l'article 6 de la convention europdenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des
libertrs fondamentales." ) (translated into English by author: That, given the state of
technology to date and technical means at their disposal, they are not able to filter
absolutely all advertisements covered by the injunction; that is technically
impossible to run on a provisional injunctions also has serious consequences
because it impedes their access to the courts of appeal, as guaranteed by Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms.").
177. Id.
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seek a stay from the Cours de Cassation, France's highest court.17 8
eBay also has considered the possibility of appealing to a different
European court, such as the European Court for Human Rights in
Strasburg, France. 179 "eBay would argue that the decision illegally
restricts the freedoms of European consumers." 80
In its effort to overturn the French court's decision, eBay, along
with three members of the European parliament, plan to "argue in
Brussels that the [I]nternet has been unfairly portrayed by luxury-
goods firms as the root cause of counterfeiting."' 181 eBay hopes to
convince the "European Commission to rewrite the rules on 'selective
distribution', which allow manufacturers to control how their products
are sold online" because, in eBay's opinion, the current rules are
"stifling e-commerce in Europe." 182 This is a huge step for eBay, as
the commissioners, with the goal of "maintain[ing] and develop[ing]
freedom, security, and justice through a seamless Europe[,]" represent
the interests of the entire European community, not only their
respective home countries.1 83 No matter what the final outcome, the
policies behind the French decision will likely be viewed unfavorably
in light of Europe's changing perspective regarding e-commerce.
Recently, eBay took the initiative to meet with luxury goods
manufacturers to discuss methods of policing counterfeit sales.' 84
Both sides discussed important issues such as tracking repeat
offenders, working together with local enforcement, and drafting
better legislation, both locally and internationally, that protects the
interests of all parties.' 85
178. See Parloff, supra note 143.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged, supra note 120.
182. Id.
183. Micheael L. Rustad, Circles of E-Consumer Trust: Old E-America v. New
E-Europe, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 183, 186 (2007). "The Commission proposes and
implements community-wide legislation and is the formal guardian of European
Community treaties." Id.
184. John Leyden, eBay breaks bread with luxury goods firns, REGISTER, July
21, 2008, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/21
/ebay-counterfeitsummit/.
185. Id.
26
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French courts have taken a stricter stance on e-commerce and the
freedom of speech in cyberspace, in comparison to courts in other
jurisdictions. 86 Many prominent luxury goods corporations, such as
LVMH, are incorporated in France, and have contributed to the
country's stylish history and image.' 8 7 The French feel the Internet,
specifically e-commerce, threatens this history and image. 188 Based on
this perception, France fiercely protects its stylish lineage. 
89
The result is a low opinion of Internet corporations and e-
commerce, particularly from corporations that deal in luxury goods.' 
90
Even local law enforcement has become involved with the
counterfeiting issue, arresting vendors and seizing products, which has
helped raise public awareness of the problem. 191 With strong opinions
186. See Souchard, supra note 159, at D08; see also John Oates, eBay wins
right to not police counterfeit goods, REGISTER, Aug. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/O8/13/ebay-loreal/ (discussing how a Belgian
court "threw out" a complaint by L'Oreal that eBay was not doing enough to combat
counterfeit items on its site). See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
187. See JOAN DEJEAN, THE ESSENCE OF STYLE: How THE FRENCH INVENTED
HIGH FASHION, FINE FOOD, CHIC CAFES, STYLE, SOPHISTICATION, AND GLAMOUR 8
(First Free Press 2005) ('Thus, virtually under royal decree, France embarked on the
most extraordinary age of creativity in its history. By the end of the seventeenth
century, the two concepts that have ever since been most essential to both the
country's fame and its trade balance had been invented and had immediately become
inextricable from France's national image: haute cuisine and haute couture.").
188. See LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Brand Protection,
http://www.lvmh.com/print.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page=pgia qjlutte.asp& (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009) ("The luxury industry is particularly hard-hit by the
counterfeiting of goods, which unlawfully takes advantage of the prestige of its
brands and harms their tradition, identity and image.").
189. See id. ("The luxury industry is particularly hard-hit by the counterfeiting
of goods, which unlawfully takes advantage of the prestige of its brands and harms
their tradition, identity and image."); see also Monica Horten, Is the EU Gunning for
eBay?, IPTEGRITY.COM, May 16, 2008, http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php?option
=comcontent&task=view&id=95&Itemid=9 (statement of Phillippe Lacoste,
chairman of Lacoste clothing manufacturer) ("'eBay ils doivent prender
responsabilite,"' which translates to, "'eBay must take responsibility."').
190. See Holahan & Matlack, supra note 115 (statement of LVMH) ("This
decision represents an important step in protecting brands and products against
parasitic practices.").
191. See LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Brand Protection,
http://www.lvmh.com/print.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page=pgjfaq-lutte.asp& (last
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against counterfeiting permeating throughout French culture, French
courts likely seek more to protect historical French corporations, than
to seriously address counterfeiters. 192 eBay has recognized the policy
and cultural underpinnings embedded in this decision.' 93
European courts' underlying desire to protect luxury goods
dealers likely affected this court's application of the law. 194 The court
stated that eBay caused "damage to the image of Christian Dior
Couture and moral damage" in that the sale of counterfeit items on the
visited Oct. 26, 2009).
192. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id-article=2354 (discussing that
Christian Dior Couture and other brands have "after decades of hard work
recognized, an outstanding global reputation placing them among the most
prestigious brands in the world" and how that reputation creates the desire to protect
it from "fake or parasitic activities.") (in French: "Attendu que la socidt6 Christian
Dior Couture crde, fabrique et commercialise des produits de haute-couture, de
maroquinerie, de pr~t-A-porter, de joaillerie, bijouterie et horlogerie sous les
marques Christian Dior et Dior, que ces marques bdndficient, aprbs des ddcennies
d'un travail considdrable reconnu, d'une notoridt6 mondiale exceptionnelle les
plaqant parmi les plus prestigieuses marques du monde . ..Attendu que cette
notorift6 voulue et entretenue par la socidt6 Christian Dior Couture suscite par
ailleurs de nombreuses convoitises qui se manifestent notamment sous la forme de
contrefaqons ou d'activitds parasitaires diverses."). Id. (discussing how "trade
globalization and the emergence of new media . . .encouraged the marketing of
fraudulent products" and how eBay helps encourage counterfeiting simply by being
"a major player in electronic commerce.") (in French: "Attendu que la
mondialisation des 6changes et l'apparition de nouveaux moyens de communication
lies A la libert6 du commerce ont favoris6 la commercialisation de produits
frauduleux dont ceux faisant l'objet de la contrefagon, flau de l'6conomie 16gale...
Attendu qu'eBay est l'acteur majeur du commerce 6lectronique.").
193. See Chrisafis, supra note 136 ("The big issue here doesn't seem to be to
do with counterfeiting-if it was they would have gone after the counterfeiters. It's
about saying we are a luxury brand, we don't want others selling our goods, even if
they are real.").
194. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id-article=2354 (in French:
Attendu que la vente de produits contrefaits sur internet ddgrade l'image des
produits de luxe des marques Dior et que le caract~re personnel, direct et certain du
prdjudice subi par la socirt6 Christian Dior Couture est constant.") (translated into
English by author: "Whereas the sale of counterfeit goods on the Internet degrades
the image of luxury goods brands as Dior and personal character, and some direct
injury suffered by the company Christian Dior Couture is constant.").
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Internet "degrades the image of luxury goods brands such as Dior."' 95
These statements may raise questions for the European Court of
Justice in Luxemburg over the proper application of the policy against
holding passive "host" Internet service providers responsible for the
violations of its users. 196 Although eBay's business model does not
entirely fit within the scope of the Directive's definition of a hosting
provider, the court's reasoning can be questioned in light of the
Directive's original purpose, 197 which was to develop e-commerce.
198
The case also illustrates the boundaries of the Directive's special
liability regime.' 99 Courts across Europe tend to disregard this special
liability regime for hosting providers. 200 As a result, the European
Commission is currently investigating this and related court decisions
and reviewing aspects of the Directive itself.
201
Accounting for French views regarding luxury goods dealers and
the court's decision, which conflicts with the Directive, it appears that
the LVMH decision rested more on policy than the applicable law.
The Directive allows an exemption for host liability where the host
takes action upon becoming aware of the situation, but also states that
host providers cannot be obligated to actively search for illegal
content uploaded by its customers. 20 2 Under these provisions, eBay
should only have been liable if it had the knowledge of specific
counterfeiting actions and failed to act. The court, however, found
eBay liable in part because of its failure to "ensure that [its] activity
does not generate illegal acts to the detriment of the company[,]
Chirstian Dior Couture." 20 3 On its face, the ruling appears to be in
195. Id. (in French: "Attendu que la vente de produits contrefaits sur internet
d6grade l'image des produits de luxe des marques Dior .....
196. Parloff, supra note 143.
197. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
198. Livolsi, supra note 152, at 473 (discussing the purposes of the Directive
as developing electronic commerce and to "reap the more immediate benefits that
electronic commerce can provide.").
199. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
200. Id. at 25-26.
201. Id. at 26.
202. Id. at 25.
203. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2354 (in French:
2009]
29
Bailey: Fighting an Anonymous Enemy: The Uncertainty of Auction Sites in
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2009
158 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
direct conflict with the provisions available under the terms of the
Directive.
The amount of damages awarded in this case further supports the
position that the decision was policy-based rather than law-based.20 4
The court's large monetary award in LVMH v. eBay may have been
made to serve as a message to both counterfeiters and those that host
or facilitate potential counterfeiters, that such practices will not be
tolerated. Lawmakers in France appear to be sending the same
message, going so far as to hold a conference on the matter, but not
formally giving eBay an opportunity to state its case on the conference
floor.20 5 At this conference, Marc Antoine Jamet, chairman of Unifab,
the French anti-counterfeit organization, "called directly for legislative
controls to be placed on the large Internet sites, including
eBay ... ,206
Overall, there is a strong policy in France and other European
countries to protect luxury goods dealers. 207 Such dealers, like LVMH,
have a long and prominent history in France, as well as an important
company standing.20 8 The court demonstrated this policy of shielding
luxury goods companies in LVMH, both in applying the law,
seemingly incorrectly, as well as by awarding an uncharacteristically
large monetary judgment against eBay.209 This decision, along with
the actions of the European Commission, and even local law
enforcement, sends the message to Internet companies, like eBay, to
stay away from European luxury goods dealers.
"Attendu en effet que eBay a manqu6 A son obligation de s'assurer que son activit6
ne gdnhre pas d'actes illicites, en l'esp~ce d'actes de contrefaqon, au pr6judice d'un
acteur 6conomique tel que la soci6t6 Christian Dior Couture.").
204. See Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121 ("One point for eBay is that
French courts rarely make large damage awards in lawsuits .... To prove it suffered
the tens of millions in damages claimed, LVMH would have to provide evidence on
each sale involving a fake product ... .
205. Horten, supra note 189.
206. Id.
207. See Caroline Casalonga and Jean-Christophe Guerrini, France: A Guide
to French Anti-Counterfeiting Law, MONDAQ INTELL. PROP. Aug. 31, 2009,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=80000.
208. See DEJEAN, supra note 187, at 36-37 (discussing the beginning of high
fashion and how modem high fashion reflects these historical roots).
209. See Matlack, LVMH v. eBay, supra note 121.
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The differences between the laws of the United States and France
are more distinct due to the practical application and underlying social
policies of the laws. Despite these distinctions, there are more
similarities, than may be expected at first glance. Thus, while the two
similar cases resulted with disturbingly dissimilar decisions, the ideals
behind the decisions may not be so different.
V. COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND FRENCH COURTS' TREATMENT OF
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Both cases illustrate the importance of acknowledging the Internet
when drafting new trademark infringement legislation. The courts in
these two cases applied different laws, but more importantly, they
applied these laws based upon differing social policies. Therefore, it is
important to understand the basic laws in both Tiffany v. eBay and
LVMH v. eBay. Once the law is understood, the public policy becomes
apparent in the courts' applications of the laws.
A. American and French Trademark and E-Commerce Laws
Generally, American trademark. law serves two purposes:
"furthering commerce" and "ensuring equitable transactions where
money alone fails to set the wronged party right., 210 In Tiffany v.
eBay, the cause of action arose from alleged violations of the Lanham
Act.211 As indicated by the broad intent of the Act, "Congress wanted
to protect both registered marks and well-known unregistered marks
from unfair competition." 212 Prior to the Act, federal courts
throughout the country issued conflicting decisions based on their
interpretations of inconsistent state trademark statutes. 21 3 The Lanham
210. Jason Berne, Comment, Court Intervention But Not In a Classic Form: A
Survey of Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1157, 1205
(1999).
211. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
212. Andrew Brabender, Note, Internet Trademark Disputes; A Modified
Approach to the Applicability of the "Goods or Services" Requirement in the
LanhamAct, 41 NEW ENG. L. REv. 115, 121 (2006).
213. See id. at 120 ('The application of state law led to many inconsistent
decisions related to trademark disputes, prompting Congress to push for the
enactment of a federal trademark law.."); see also id. at 138-39.
2009]
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Act reflects the combination of a variety of court opinions regarding
trademark infringement and unfair competition. 214 Overall, the
Lanham Act provides uniform federal law and "expands the protection
afforded by state trademark law."
215
Due to changing business practices, the Lanham Act was amended
by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.216 Some important
provisional changes to the Lanham Act dealt with commercial
advertising and promotion.217 Advertising is lucrative for companies
whose websites often display products to draw in business. 218 Because
advertising plays such an important role in a website's business, it
made sense for the provisional changes to specifically address it.
While this undoubtedly helped clear up some confusion the courts had
in applying the Lanham Act to modem day trademark issues, the
revisions did not explicitly address e-commerce.219
In contrast, the European E-Commerce Directive 2000/3 1/EC
explicitly attends to several e-commerce issues. 220 Adopted in 2000,
the Directive "was created to encourage and promote the development
of e-commerce by providing legal certainty and clarity ... ,,221 The
purpose of the Directive was thus grounded in economics.
222
214. See Sunderji, supra note 20, at 917 ("The Lanham Act was introduced as
a bill 'to place all matters relating to trademarks in one statute and to eliminate
judicial obscurity . . . and [to make] relief against infringement prompt and
effective."'); see also Brabender, supra note 212, at 123 ("With confusion over the
interpretation of select provisions of the Lanham Act, Congress created the
Trademark Review Commission to recommend changes that would unify the federal
circuits in their interpretation of the Act." (citation omitted)).
215. EDWARD P. DAVIS, JR., ET. AL., Potential Liability on the Internet, in
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 78 (Thomson Reuters 2009) (2001).
216. Brabender, supra note 212, at 139.
217. Id. at 140.
218. Kessler, supra note 46, at 393.
219. Cf Brabender, supra note 212, at 139 ("[A]lthough the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 changed several key phrases in the text of the statute, the
underlying purpose of the Act remained the same: to protect business trademark
owners and public consumers.").
220. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25 ("The case is an interesting
illustration of the difficulties that are currently associated with the special liability
regime for hosting providers ... under the European E-Commerce Directive.").
221. Patrick Van Eecke & Barbara Ooms, ISP Liability and the E-Commerce
Directive: A Growing Trend Toward Greater Responsibility for ISPS, 11 No. 4 J.
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Of particular importance to the analysis in LVMH v. eBay is the
limited liability regime within the Directive. These limitations only
apply to specific online service providers, including hosting providers,
and cover liability for all types of illegal activities initiated by third
parties, such as trademark infringement. 223 Lastly, this provision
applies only to monetary damages, leaving the possibility of injunctive
relief in the courts. 224
While the Lanham Act and the E-Commerce Directive have key
differences, the laws also exhibit similarities. Both require knowledge
on the part of the alleged infringer, in these cases eBay.225 The court
in Tiffany v. eBay rationalized that Tiffany had not shown the requisite
knowledge necessary to hold eBay liable for trademark
infringement.226 Similarly, under the Directive, "[a] hosting provider
may not be held liable when it does not have actual knowledge of
illegal activity or information." 227 One difference between the two
knowledge requirements is that under the Lanham Act, according to
the Inwood test, general knowledge is insufficient to meet the
knowledge requirement, 228 whereas under the Directive the knowledge
requirement is satisfied if the hosting provider is simply "aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is
apparent." 229
The Lanham Act and the Directive both require a host provider to
act once it has knowledge of illegal activity.230 In Tiffany v. eBay, the
INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2007) [hereinafter Van Eecke & Ooms].
222. See Livolsi, supra note 152, at 474 ("Acknowledging the economic stake
in e-commerce, the European Commission put forth in 1997 a communication
entitled A European Initiative on Electronic Commerce.").
223. Van Eecke & Ooms, supra note 221, at 4.
224. Id.
225. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (stating that a manufacturer must know or have reason to know of the
infringement in order to be liable); see also Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 13-14,
2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC) (stating that a service provider "is not liable" for damages if
it does not have actual knowledge of the unlawful act).
226. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
227. Van Eecke & Ooms, supra note 221, at 4.
228. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
229. Van Eecke & Ooms, supra note 221, at 4.
230. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 920 (discussing the rule set in the United
States Supreme Court that if the manufacturer or distributor continues to act once it
2009]
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court outlined steps eBay took to remove the illegal items once it
learned of the illegal sales.231 The court considered the removal of the
infringing items as a factor in determining whether or not an
intermediary had knowledge of the illegal activity. 232 The Directive
explicitly requires action by the hosting provider once it has
knowledge of the illegal activity.233 The hosting provider must remove
or disable public access to the illegal information. 234 Therefore, the
classification of the alleged Internet counterfeiter plays a
determinative role in the application of the law.
B. Application and Public Policy of France's Trademark and E-
Commerce Directive
While there are similarities between the requirements of the
Lanham Act and the E-Commerce Directive, there remain stark
differences in how American and French courts interpreted the laws'
respective provisions. For example, both United States and French law
require courts to decide what role eBay played in the overall
counterfeiting process; however, the courts differed in this
determination.235
In Tiffany v. eBay, the court labeled eBay a servicer of the
website, and did not discuss eBay as a host provider.236 A service
knows or has reason to know of the infringement, there is liability); Council
Directive 2000/31, arts. 13-14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC) (discussing that if a service
provider does have actual knowledge of the unlawful act, it must act to remove the
information or disable access to the information).
231. Tiffany, 576F. Supp. 2dat487-88.
232. Id. at 514 (discussing the anti-fraud measures that eBay took to prevent
counterfeiters and how these helped the court decide that eBay was not willfully
blind).
233. Van Eecke & Ooms, supra note 221, at 5 ("Should a hosting provider
obtain knowledge or awareness of an illegal activity or information, then it must
expeditiously remove or disable access to the information.").
234. Id.
235. Compare Van Eecke, & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25 ("According to this
Directive . . . hosting providers cannot be obligated to actively search for illegal
content uploaded by their customers."), with Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 506
("Accordingly, the Court will look not only to whether eBay provided the necessary
marketplace for the counterfeiting . . . but further, to whether eBay had direct control
over the means of the infringement.").
236. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
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provider supplies online services, network access or operates such
facilities.237 Conversely, in LVMH v. eBay, the French court labeled
eBay as a hosting provider, because "it stores information uploaded by
its customers regarding items put up for sale." 238 The French court
considered eBay an "online auction service provider" as it offers tools
to sell items, "presents items in an attractive way, and imposes a set of
auction rules on sellers and buyers." 239 Subsequently, the French court
found eBay could not benefit from the special liability regime set up
under the Directive, and thus ordinary liability rules applied.240
However, based on the clear wording of the Directive, however, eBay
should have received protection through the special liability regime,
regardless of being an auction provider, due to its role as a hosting
provider.241
Public policy behind e-commerce and traditional business
practices appears to have swayed courts' applications of the Directive.
For example, European courts tend to disregard the special liability
regime in the Directive for hosting providers.242 The language in the
Directive adds to the overall confusion. Namely, Article 15 of the
Directive does not create a general obligation to monitor information,
but still also allows courts to impose an obligation in specific cases.243
The courts also have broad discretion in interpreting such distinctions,
and it is not easy to make a clear-cut distinction between the two
monitoring obligations. 244 Public policy fills the void left by the
237. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 215, at 37-38. ("[T]he term 'service provider' is
defined as 'an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections
for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material
as sent or received."').
238. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 25-26.
243. Van Eecke, & Ooms, supra note 221, at 5.
244. Id. ("[I]f certain measures are required from a mere conduit, a caching, or
a hosting provider, such measures cannot imply a general obligation to monitor the
information that they transmit or store. Instead, monitoring obligations may be
imposed in specific cases. The interpretation of this distinction is left to the national
legislators and the national judges. In our opinion, it is not easy to make a clear
distinction between monitoring obligations of a general nature and monitoring
2009]
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Directive.245 Even in applying the law, the Directive is not the only
factor taken into consideration; another factor is the context of law
that "protects public health, and consumer interests."2 46 In light of
LVMH v. eBay and other cases, the European Commission has begun
to review the application of the Directive. 247
Differing cultural ideas about acceptable business practices may
have also influenced the two courts' final decisions regarding eBay's
liability. For example, "[t]he practice of selling genuine products
through unauthorized channels-sometimes called gray
marketeering-is generally lawful in the United States because it is
thought to benefit the consumer." 248 In direct contrast, France fiercely
protects their luxury goods and their brands.249 Other court decisions
in France have highlighted this business attitude. In Hermes v.
eBay,250 for example, the court ordered eBay to pay C20,000 for not
properly inspecting the sale of handbags.251
In addition to differing business practices, each country holds
differing views on large Internet companies in general. American
businesses have embraced the "electronic revolution," and the
government has played an active role in promoting e-commerce and
Internet use. 252 The French take a very different stance. In addition to
obligations in specific cases.").
245. Id. ("In a few cases, we even see a tendency of judges to disregard Article
15 of the E-Commerce Directive by imposing injunctions on online service
providers that contain broad monitoring obligations.").
246. Livolsi, supra note 152, at 476.
247. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 26.
248. Parloff, supra note 143.
249. See Carvajal, supra note 32; see also LVMH.com, LVMH FAQ: Brand
Protection, http://www.lvmh.com/print.asp?rep=fonctionalite&page
=pgjfaqlutte.asp& (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) ("In France, police operations
leading to the arrest of itinerant vendors of counterfeit products and the seizure of
products from consumers have helped to raise the awareness of the public to the fact
that buying counterfeit products is also illegal.").
250. Van Eecke & Truyens, supra note 15, at 25.
251. Carvajal, supra note 32.
252. See Hearing on Electronic Commerce Before the H. Small Business
Subcomm. on Government Programs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Rep.
Roscoe Bartlett, Chairman of Small Business Subcomm. on Government Programs)
("Many businesses in the private sector are now relying upon the Internet to buy
goods and services.").
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being targeted by lawmakers,253 Internet companies are also targeted
by luxury companies. As LVMH stated: "We're not going to accuse
Monsieur X or Madame y.,, 254 This position illustrates luxury goods
companies' concerns about the "mass-distribution network" rather
than individuals who may engage in a single sale. 255 LVMH's
comment simply underscores the attitudes of the French public and the
French courts toward large Internet companies and how it differs from
American attitudes toward those companies.
Policy and attitudes towards business and Internet companies
played an active role in Tiffany v. eBay. There, the court makes
several statements which imply that it does not entirely agree with
current law. In one such statement the court explained, while it is "not
unsympathetic to Tiffany and other rights owners... the law is
clear .... ,256 The court placed the responsibility for the decision on
the Legislature, explaining that, "[p]olicymakers may yet decide that
the law as it stands is inadequate to protect rights-owners in light of
the increasing scope of Internet commerce and the concomitant rise in
potential trademark infringement." 257 The court, however, while
vocalizing its personal opinion on the current law and underlying
business implications, strictly followed the application of the law. 258
Conversely, the French court, applied the Directive in such a way as to
get around the protection that seemingly is owed to eBay. 259
253. Horten, supra note 189.
254. Souchard, supra note 159.
255. Id. ("Asked whether that meant that smaller online vendors could also be
targeted, the LVMH spokeswoman said no, insisting that the French group was more
concerned about the 'mass-distribution network."').
256. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
257. Id. at 470.
258. Id. at 527.
259. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?idarticle=2354 (discussing
eBay's status as a service provider, but finding that ebay's role as a broker does not
allow eBay to avoid liability under the Directive) (in French: "Attendu en
cons6quence que eBay, en sa qualit6 de courtier, ne bfndficie pas d'un statut
ddrogatoire au titre de sa responsabilit6 et relive donc, comme tout acteur du
commerce, du rdgime commun de la responsabilit6 civile.") (translated into English
by author: "Considering therefore that eBay, as a broker, does not enjoy special
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Therefore, rather than strictly applying the law, the French court
appears to have incorporated French public policy as well.
Filtering public policy and ideas into a legal decision drastically
impacts not only eBay's business, but Internet commerce as a whole.
Both Tiffany v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay illustrate the need for a
reexamination of the laws governing Internet commerce. The laws
must be refocused to adequately balance the needs of Internet
businesses with those of the rights-owners. Unlike traditional "brick
and mortar" businesses, the impact of infringement is potentially far
more harmful to Internet businesses.260 The trademark holder is forced
to "police the entire Web" to protect its trademark,26' while online
auction websites, such as eBay, are faced with mounting lawsuits. 262 If
the laws are not refined and refocused, the implications could have a
negative lasting impact because regulations for online businesses,
such as eBay, will remain inconsistent, thus leaving businesses on
both sides of this argument unsure of the steps needed to protect
themselves.
C. Business Implications
E-commerce has increased over time and this trend is likely to
continue. 263 Undoubtedly, the Internet impacts not only the way
business is done, but also the accompanying legal issues associated
with e-commerce. 264 Counterfeiting, a legal matter, also influences
business practices because of the impact felt by consumers. The
Internet's global reach has facilitated counterfeiting, which in turn has
status under its responsibility and is therefore, like every player trade, the common
system of civil liability.").
260. Kessler, supra, note 46, at 385.
261. Id. at 384-85.
262. See Matlack, Hermes Beats eBay, supra note 45 (discussing several
lawsuits filed against eBay over the sale of counterfeit goods).
263. See DAVIS ET. AL., supra note 215, at 20-21 ("[C]ommercial use of the
Internet to conduct on-line sales of products and services has evolved from a novelty
to a significant business channel.").
264. Christopher Paul Boam, The Internet: Information and the Culture of
Regulatory Change: A Modem Renaissance, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 175, 175
(2001) (discussing the amount of people that use the Internet daily and the amount
the "Internet economy" has generated).
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affected consumer trust.265 Consumers purchasing items on the
Internet must trust the online business and its products. 266 Purchasing
items that turn out to be counterfeit decreases consumer trust, and, of
course, if that trust is broken, Internet businesses will suffer.267
Decreases in consumer trust especially hurt luxury goods companies;
Cheryl Solomon, general counsel for Gucci, explains, "We don't make
any money from sales on eBay, but we have to tell people that their
bag isn't real, that we can't help them get their money back, and we
become the bad guys. ' 268
Commentators disagree on how the courts' decisions will affect
eBay's business and Internet commerce in general. Some argue the
French court's decision will not drastically affect the way eBay
conducts its business, because eBay had already unilaterally taken
steps to control counterfeiters. 269 Another argument posits that while
luxury goods companies seek to protect the reputation of their brands,
in dealing with eBay they are merely limiting the ability of consumers
to sell to one another at reduced prices. 270
eBay does not share the same optimism that the decision will not
affect the way it conducts its business, cautioning that the French
court's decision will damage auction and peer-to-peer sale websites. 271
eBay argues that decisions like LVMH v. eBay could "give brand
owners almost unbridled power to block consumer selling of branded
goods online." 272 Such power would undermine eBay's efforts to
transform the company from an "online flea market" to a place to
purchase brand-name merchandise. 273
Not all aspects of the lawsuits brought against the company have
been negative, however, because they caused eBay to strengthen its
265. Cf. id. ("The collective impact of these peculiar characteristics of the
Internet on traditional notions of business not only offers the greatest opportunities
but also exhorts the most challenging legal issues.").
266. Id. at 176.
267. See id. (discussing the importance of customers trusting on-line
businesses with their personal information).
268. eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged, supra note 116.
269. Carvajal, supra note 32.
270. George, supra note 17.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Holahan & Matlack, supra note 115.
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VeRO program.274 For instance, eBay views the French ruling in the
suit brought by Hermes as somewhat positive because the court, by
not requiring eBay to take additional anti-counterfeiting measures,
seemingly accepted e'Bay's argument that "since 2006 [eBay] had
strengthened the Vero program,"; the judge in that case stated: "The
tools you had in place in 2006 were not enough., 275 Still, eBay argues
that if the most recent French decision in LVMH v. eBay is allowed to
stand, brand owners would have almost complete power to block
consumers from selling branded goods online.276 This would cause
damage to both other online auction websites and consumers, because
consumers would be limited in their ability to utilize e-commerce
while businesses would lose revenue. 277
This dispute presents consumers with two differing perspectives
to consider. From the pro-brand perspective, the cases' importance
centers on whether online auction websites can be held liable for
counterfeit sales occurring on their website. 278 If companies cannot
force eBay to cease auctions carrying their brands, counterfeiting will
continue. 279 It would be nearly impossible to locate all of the
counterfeit merchandise, and new counterfeiters will continue to
emerge. 280 On the other hand, from the pro-eBay perspective, the
cases against eBay are viewed as an attempt to prevent competition
from the sale of genuine goods. 281 This view promotes e-commerce
generally, because such restrictions on competition may stifle the
274. Matlack, Hermes Beat eBay, supra note 45; see supra text accompanying
notes 43-44 (discussing eBay's VeRO program).
275. Id.
276. George, supra note 17; see also Souchard, supra note 159 (statement of
eBay) ("Today's ruling is about an attempt by LVMH to protect uncompetitive
commercial practices at the expense of consumer choice and the livelihood of law-
abiding sellers that eBay empowers every day...
277. See Souchard, supra note 159, at D08.
278. Farmer, supra note 4 ("In the pro-brand-maker perspective, these cases
are a battle over whether counterfeit sales online can be attacked centrally."); see
also id. (discussing if an online auction business, such as eBay, can be forced to
cease auctions on its site and be held centrally liable for counterfeiting online).
279. Id. ("No maker can catch all the fakes and have eBay take them off
auction. New sellers of fake goods will keep springing up even if some sellers are
sued out of existence. Also, some people are happy to buy fakes on the cheap.").
280. Id.
281. Id.
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growth of online business. 282 "If eBay is going to be strictly liable to a
brand maker for the sale of any fake on its site, eBay's only option to
avoid liability may be to block the sale of that entire brand on its site,
even genuine used goods." 283
Identifying the possible business implications highlights the
difficulties businesses face after the court reached its decision. By
finding eBay guilty of contributory infringement, and finding its
efforts to police counterfeiting insufficient, the French court has
opened the door for similar suits by luxury goods companies against
online auction websites. 284 From a business standpoint, such high
expectations on controlling counterfeiting are simply unrealistic for
many companies.285 On the other hand, luxury goods companies also
face business implications in the loss of consumer trust and in the
value of their products. For either party, business implications are
important and must be considered when drafting proposed Internet
laws.
V. INTERNET LAWS AND PROPOSED CHANGES
The Internet presents courts with new legal situations where
traditional contributory trademark laws do not directly apply.286
Courts have extended contributory trademark infringement liability to
Internet businesses where the court determines someone other than the
direct infringer should be held liable.287 Courts face several concerns,
282. eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged, supra note 120 (discussing the current
European Commission rules on "selective distribution[,]" which allow
manufacturers to control online sales of their products were written before the
Internet "took off and are now stifling e-commerce in Europe.").
283. Farmer, supra note 4.
284. eBay's Legal Woes: Handbagged, supra note 120 ("If eBay loses ... 'we
will probably see many more brand-owners filing similar suits."').
285. Id. ("We have 2000 employees worldwide fighting fraud .... and if we
have to do much more, you have to wonder to what extent our business model can
exist.").
286. Kessler, supra note 46, at 377; see also DAVIS ET AL., supra note 208, at
89 ("However, there are some situations where the application of trademark and
unfair competition law to an Internet context is particularly unique."); see also,
Berne, supra note 210, at 1205 ("Though flexible, the [Lanham] Act was not created
with the Internet in mind.").
287. Kessler, supra note 46, at 377.
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however, in applying the existing tests to these situations as Internet
businesses do not fit the standard manufacturer/distributor mold.28
Additionally, rights-owners do not face individual thieves who sell
items on the black market, but rather an "anonymous mass" of Internet
users.289 The legal system has been forced to find an appropriate way
to apply existing legal principles to situations arising over the Internet.
Instead of placing the responsibility on the judicial system, the
Legislative branch needs to draft new laws that directly deal with
Internet commerce.
Legislatures have been hesitant to pass Internet laws.290 Some
suggest this is purposefully done so lawmakers can view various e-
commerce issues and how they are resolved. 291 With no help from the
Legislatures, courts have tried to address the legal shortfalls.292 The
reliance on courts has led to a conflict in international law as seen in
comparing Tiffany v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay. One proposed solution
to the conflict these cases present is to take the existing rules and
tailor them to fit the Internet context. 293 While these laws would likely
help solve the copyright concerns of creativity, they will not
necessarily solve the growing business concerns.294 Therefore, the
Legislatures, both in France, the United States, and elsewhere need to
288. Id.
289. Andrew Shapiro, The 'Principles in Context' Approach to Internet
Policymaking, 1 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
290. Peter Linzer, From the Gutenberg Bible to the Net Neutrality-How
Technology Makes Law and Why English Majors Need to Understand It, 39
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 24 (2008) (discussing how six bills died in the 109th
Congress); see also Boam, supra note 264, at 187-89 (discussing how prospects for
Internet regulation legislation were "hotly debated" during the 106th Congress but
never came to a final vote. Substantive measures of the legislation never came to a
formal vote even though they were successfully reported on from assigned
committees).
291. Hearing on Electronic Commerce Before the H. Small Business
Subcomm. on Government Programs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Deidre
Lee, Administrator, Office of Fed. Procurement Policy) ("So as hard as it is for us to
... stay, we're intentionally staying kind of one step behind industry and following
their lead on the technology.").
292. See Boam, supra note 264, at 188.
293. Shapiro, supra note 289, at 9-10.
294. Id. at 9 ("In the case of copyright and creativity, applying principles in
context is again crucial to finding the right rule to reconcile competing interests.").
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create laws that balance the need to protect the rights of luxury goods
companies with the promotion of e-commerce.
295
An appropriate law would have two parts, requiring different
actions and consequences for each described situation. The first
section of the law should focus on the protection of e-commerce. If a
service provider or host provider does not have knowledge of the
infringement on its website, but takes consistent appropriate steps to
dissuade counterfeiters and attempt to prevent counterfeiting, it should
not be liable for trademark infringement. This knowledge requirement
would help websites avoid the "unreasonable burden.., of pre-
screening all of their content .... " 296 By avoiding such a large
expense, many smaller websites will remain in business and will be
given the opportunity to flourish.2 9 7 Additionally, the extra money the
companies save can, and should, be used to implement appropriate
steps to prevent counterfeiting.
The language of the law should require companies to take
appropriate steps to prevent counterfeiting. While such language could
be viewed as ambiguous, examples of these appropriate measures can
be viewed in court interpretations. In Tiffany v. eBay, the court felt
eBay, "consistently took steps to improve its technology and develop
anti-fraud measures as those measures became technologically
feasible and reasonably available." 298 Such steps included: setting up a
counterfeiting program, having employees police the website for new
counterfeit items, and taking immediate action against
counterfeiters. 299 It would be reasonable to leave the language
ambiguous so it remains malleable as technology continues to mature.
295. See Hearing on Electronic Commerce Before the H. Small Business
Subcomm. on Government Programs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Deidre
Lee, Administrator, Office of Fed. Procurement Policy) ("As we're moving to use
the new technologies, we also have to make some changes to fully enhance the
possibilities.").
296. Kessler, supra note 46, at 405.
297. See id. ("Imposition of such a burden to pre-screen content for
infringement may otherwise threaten the very existence of many Internet businesses
and the viability of online services that benefit the public.").
298. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
299. Id. at 489-92 (discussing the various measures eBay took against
counterfeiters).
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The courts should not be constricted in looking for specific actions by
companies. Instead, the courts should be able to analyze the steps
companies have taken to prevent counterfeiting, and use previous
court decisions as precedence.
This provision would promote e-commerce by refusing to restrict
websites from expanding their commerce potential.3°° Moreover, such
a provision would serve the original purpose of the Lanham Act, the
protection of a rights-owners trademark, by requiring websites to
dissuade and punish counterfeiting. The websites and the general
public will get the message that the trademark must be respected. 30' In
this way, both parties receive some protection and the underlying
policy behind the Lanham Act remains intact.
The second portion of the law should provide that, if the hosting
provider does have specific knowledge of the counterfeiting behavior
and fails to take additional steps to stop and punish the
counterfeiter(s), the website shall be appropriately punished. Further,
the court will have the discretion to make the hosting provider issue a
public apology to the rights-owner. In doing so, the public will again
receive the message that counterfeiting is unacceptable. In applying
the actual punishment, courts should take into consideration the extent
of the harm the counterfeiting caused to the trademark in question, and
the effect the punishment has on the Internet company's business. For
example, excessive fines could restrict e-commerce or force
businesses out of the marketplace. 30 2 The purpose of the law, and the
court in applying the law, should be to promote e-commerce, as well
as protect the rights-owners. 30 3
300. See Berne, supra note 210, at 1158 ("[S]ome commentators have argued
that forcing courts to apply existing laws to issues they were not made to resolve
will proliferate litigation, create confusion among courts, and prevent the Internet
from ever reaching its potential.").
301. See Sunderji, supra note 20, at 927 ("The state provides authors with a
personal benefit as an incentive to create and disseminate valuable works of art to
the public. Accordingly, copyright law aims to enrich the public, while the authors'
gain is secondary.").
302. See id. at 939 ("With the huge financial burden of preventing
counterfeiting, eBay would likely scale back its geographic expansion and its
development of new Internet technologies.").
303. See Berne, supra note 210, at 1206 ("Thus, when confronted with
determining an appropriate remedy for cases involving trademark infringement on
the Internet, a court must balance the traditional goal of furthering commerce with
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This proposed law would strike a balance between protection and
business, something that has been difficult to establish.30 4 Although it
would require similar concepts as provisions in the past, this would
not be a safe guard provision. 30 5 Unlike a safe harbor provision, this
law would have both a knowledge requirement and an action
requirement to bring a successful claim of trademark infringement.
These dual requirements offer more protection to rights-owners by not
allowing a website to avoid liability based on a lack of knowledge, as
seen in Tiffany v. eBay. This law allows websites to avoid liability by
a show of action, instead of an exemption based solely on the
definition of the website's activity. This avoids a major flaw seen in
the European E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, which allows
courts to use classifications of websites to control which companies
receive special protections. 30 6
Whereas the E-Commerce Directive was very narrow in its
specifications for special liability, this proposed law would apply
broadly to any website that either provides content, facilitates a sale
the underlying attitudes nascent to the Internet.").
304. See id. at 1161 ("Thus, from its earliest conception, trademark law has
had simultaneous, sometimes conflicting goals of furthering commerce, while at the
same time ensuring equitable transactions where money alone cannot set the
wronged party right.").
305. A Safe Harbor Provision proposed by Sunderji would require that the
online auction sites (and some online retailers) be the only sites eligible for liability
protection. Sunderji, supra note 20, at 941. The author's proposal differs from
Sunderji's proposal, which protects a much broader array of websites. Another
difference between the author's proposal and Sunderji's proposal is that Sunderji
recommends that the site shall only be required to act when they have knowledge of
counterfeiting and must not profit from counterfeiting if the site exhibits control
over the instrumentality used for the infringement. Id. This comment proposes that
appropriate steps to dissuade counterfeiting are always present and requires the site
to take further action when there is knowledge of counterfeiting. One final
difference is the requirement of a duty to monitor and have control. In this
comment's proposal there is no specific duty to monitor or control, only a broad
definition of appropriate steps, to be determined (on a case-by-case fact specific
analysis) by the judicial system. Id. at 943-44. In this way, the proposed law will not
have to be consistently amended to keep up with ever-changing technology, but
instead will allow the courts to decide cases based upon evidence of appropriate
preventative measures taken by the website.
306. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC).
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between third parties, or both.3°7 By making the provision apply
broadly there will be less argument as to whether or not the website
falls under a specific category. There will also be less room for public
policy to dictate whether or not the website receives special liability, a
problem seen in LVMH v. eBay.30 8 And, while one argument against
such a broad definition may be the additional expense websites will
incur by having to insure appropriate actions will be taken to prevent
counterfeiting, the protection afforded to rights-holders will be crucial.
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that some form of global legislative action is
needed to in the near future to solve the rapidly growing problem of
Internet counterfeiting. In the United States, the lack of a uniform law
has led some states to adopt primitive versions of proposed uniform
laws controlling e-commerce transactions. 30 9 This uniformity issue
arose before the Lanham Act was finally passed in 1946, and broad
legislation encompassing e-commerce would likely solve this
problem. Further, as this Comment proposes a legislative pattern for
countries worldwide to adopt, while each country will legislate claims
within their own court system, a level of worldwide uniformity may
be achieved. Through the application of this legislative pattern, e-
commerce law would apply more uniformly to websites which operate
globally, such as eBay. The benefit of such a legislative pattern is that
jurisdictional disputes and conflicting decisions, as evinced by Tiffany
v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay, would arise less frequently, and
companies operating e-commerce websites would be subject to a more
uniform law, rather than a multitude of different provisions from
various countries. 310
While the legislative pattern, that this Comment proposes
countries around the globe adopt, would appropriately handle some of
307. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 215, at 13-18 (discussing examples of "players
on the internet" and the various classifications such as access providers, content
providers, and four other categories of "players.").
308. Christian Dior Couture/ eBay Inc., eBay International AG, Tribunal de
Commerce [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008, l'ere chambre B, available at
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id-article=2354.
309. Boam, supra note 257, at 189.
310. See discussion supra Part IV.
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the Internet counterfeiting situations, the Internet is constantly
evolving. The legislature must consider this in developing the law.311
Along those same lines, the legislatures must also take into account
the general public's role in the counterfeiting dilemma. The enactment
of Internet legislation will provide the public with a form of education
on the dangers of counterfeiting which may help improve the
situation.312 Through new legislation as well as the additional security
measures taken by websites to prevent counterfeiting, the public will
become more conscious of this problem.
Consumers will become safer in their purchases and trust will be
restored, not only to the rights-owners but also to the websites
themselves. E-commerce will be protected and continue to grow, as
will business for rights-owners, who will have their goods in the hands
of consumers. In the end, everyone wins: the rights-owners, the
Internet business, and, perhaps most important to both groups, the
consumer.
Shanna Bailey*
311. Kessler, supra note 46, at 398 ("[R]ather than wait for the problem to
grow large enough to spur corrective legislative action, it should be eliminated at the
source.").
312. See Hearing on Electronic Commerce Before the H. Small Business
Subcomm. on Government Programs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Max
Summers, State Director, Missouri Small Business Development Center) ("Although
we cannot change the market forces, we can help these businesses understand e-
commerce and that it's likely to bring huge shifts in our economic structure, both in
the U.S. and in the global economy. We must educate these companies to understand
that e-commerce is poised to pull significant dollars from the traditional economy.").
* Mrs. Bailey is a third year law student at Cal. Western, J.D. expected January
2010. Mrs. Bailey graduated from the University of Washington with a B.A. in
History and Anthropology. The author wishes to thank Professor Nancy Kim for her
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